Murder of the Insured as a Defense to a Suit on a Life Insurance Policy by Mintz, Copal
St. John's Law Review 
Volume 3 
Number 2 Volume 3, May 1929, Number 2 Article 4 
June 2014 
Murder of the Insured as a Defense to a Suit on a Life Insurance 
Policy 
Copal Mintz 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview 
Recommended Citation 
Mintz, Copal (1929) "Murder of the Insured as a Defense to a Suit on a Life Insurance Policy," St. John's 
Law Review: Vol. 3 : No. 2 , Article 4. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/lawreview/vol3/iss2/4 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in St. John's Law Review by an authorized editor of St. John's Law Scholarship 
Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
MURDER OF THE INSURED AS A DEFENSE TO
A SUIT ON A LIFE INSURANCE POLICY
A THE beneficiary of insurance on the life of B, murdersI the latter. Is A or his estate or his assignee entitled
to the insurance?
The question has arisen and been decided more fre-
quently than might be supposed.
All the cases in point hold that neither the murderer nor
anyone claiming under him, can recover.1 The reason for
the rule is that the court will not permit a wrong-doer to
profit from his wrong. "It would be a reproach to the juris-
prudence of the country, if one could recover insurance
money payable on the death of a party whose life he had
feloniously taken. As well might he recover insurance money
upon a building that he had wilfully fired." 2 It is imma-
terial whether or not the anticipated recovery of the insur-
ance motivated the crime; 3 the killing, however, must be
felonious. 4
'Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assoc., 1 Q. B. Div. 147 (1892) ;
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co. v. Shane, 98 Ark. 132, 135 S. W. 836 (1911) ;
Henry v. Knights and Daughters of Tabor, 156 Ark. 165, 246 S. W. 17 (1922) ;
Knights & Ladies of Honor v. Menkhausen, 209 Ill. 277, 70 N. E. 567 (1904) ;
Schmidt v. Northern Life Insurance Co., 112 Iowa 41, 83 N. W. 800 (1900) ;
Slocum v. Metropolitan Life Insurance Co., 245 Mass. 565, 139 N. E. 816(1923); Welch v. Travellers' Insurance Co., 178 N. Y. Supp. 748 (1919);
Goldstein v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., Special Term, Part I, N. Y. County,
N. Y. L. J., September 5, 1928; Goldstein v. Metropolitan, 133 Misc. 106, 231
N. Y. Supp. 161 (New York County, 1928); Robinson v. Metropolitan Life
Ins. Co., 69 Pa. Super. 274; Anderson v. Life Ins. Co. of Va., 152 N. C. 1, 67
S. E. 53 (1910); Filmore v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 82 Ohio State, 208,
92 N. E. 26 (1910); Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Weightman, 61 Okl. 106, 160
Pac. Rep. 629 (1916) ; Murchison v. Murchison, 203 S. W. 423 (Texas, 1918) ;
Johnston v. Metropolitan, 85 W. Va. 70, 100 S. E. 865 (1919); Hewitt v.
Equitable Life Assurance Society, 8 Fed. (2d), 706 (C. C. A. 9th, 1925);
Kascoutas v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 185 N. W. 125 (Iowa, 1921); see also New
York Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 32 S. E. 475 (Va., 1899).
'Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U. S. 591 (1886).
' Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Fund Life Assoc., supra Note 1, where the
murderer did not even know of the insurance, see decision of the Divisional
Court, 44 Abb. L. J. 382, 64 L. T. R. 220. In most of the cases cited supra
Note 1, there was no allegation that the murder was committed for the purpose
of collecting the insurance.
'In Holden v. Ancient Order, 43 N. E. 772 (Ill. 1895), it was held that
where a beneficiary is insane when he murders the insured, he does not forfeit
the insurance.
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An analogous situation is presented where a testator is
murdered by a legatee or devisee or where an intestate is
murdered by one of his heirs or next of kin. Shall the mur-
derer participate in the estate of his victim? While all the
cases are in accord that he should not, the courts in most of
the states in which the question has arisen, have, in cases of
intestacy, deemed themselves bound to apply literally the
provisions of their statutes of descent and distribution.5 The
prevailing opinion of Earl, J., in the New York case of Riggs
v. Palmer 6 presents the view that the statutes should be read
in the light of controlling fundamental principles of the
common law,7 while the dissenting opinion of Gray, J., sets
forth the opposing view that the courts are bound strictly by
the letter of the statute though if "the decision of the ques-
tion could be affected by considerations of an equitable
nature" there would be no hesitation in assenting "to views
which commend themselves to the conscience." s
When it comes to insurance, decision is not embarrassed
by statutory considerations. The equitable principle that
one may not profit by his wrong controls.9
The question then arises, what becomes of the insurance?
Is the insurance company's undertaking to pay cancelled
completely or does the insurance become payable to one other
than the named beneficiary, and if the latter, to whom?
' See cases cited, infra Note 7.
'115 N. Y. 506, 22 N. E. 188 (1889).
'Ibid., 508-515.
'Ibid., 515-520. In England it seems to be settled that a murderer forfeits
his rights and interests in the estate of his victim (see Cleaver v. Mutual
Reserve, supra Note 1; Estate of Julian Bernard Hall, 1914, Probate 1). Simi-
larly in Massachusetts (see Slocum v. Metropolitan 816, 817, supra Note 1),
Missouri (see Perry v. Strawbridge, 209 Mo. 621, 108 S. W. 641 (1908)), and
Tennessee (see Box v. Lanier, 112 Tenn. 393, 79 S. W. 1042 (1904). Contra
are: Kansas (McAllister v. Fair, 72 Kan. 539, 84 Pac. 112 (1906)), Nebraska.
(Shellenberger v. Ransom, 41 Neb. 631, 59 N. W. 935 (1894)), reversing
prior decision to the contrary in same case, reported in 31 Neb. 61, 47 N. W.
700 (1891)), North Carolina (Owens v. Owens, 100 N. C. 246, 6 S. E. 794
(1888)), Oklahoma (see Equitable Life Assurance v. Weightman, supra Note
1), Ohio (Deem v. Millikin, 6 Ohio Circ. Ct. R. 357), Pennsylvania (Carpen.
ter's Estate, 170 Pa. 203, 32 Atl. 637 (1895)), West Virginia (Johnston v.
Met., supra Note 1). The courts of Iowa came to the same conclusion (Kuhn
v. Kuhn, 125 Iowa 449, 101 N. W. 151 (1904)), but the statutes of that state
appear to have been subsequently changed so as to exclude murderers from
participation in the estates of their victims (Code, Sec. 3386).
' Cases, supra Note 1.
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The insurance companies have argued that the contract
with the decedent was to pay the designated beneficiary, and
where the latter forfeits his right to such payment, no other
contract can be enforced in its place.
This position is obviously inequitable. Any particular
designation of a beneficiary is purely accidental as far as the
insurance company is concerned. It is a provision not vital
to its part in the contract. The designation is wholly within
the discretion of the person procuring the insurance and is
a matter of utter indifference to the insurance company. To
exempt the insurance company from payment because of the
identity of the beneficiary seems wholly unjust. There is no
reason why insurance companies "in such a case should be
allowed to say, though they might have received premiums
perhaps for thirty years and still retained the same, that
public policy forbade their paying the sum of money which
they had contracted to pay." 10
The courts, refusing with almost complete unanimity to
yield to the argument of the insurance companies, have held
that in such a case the insurance is payable to the estate of
the insured." Some of the cases state the conclusion with-
out reasoning, apparently in the belief that the conclusion is
almost axiomatic.' 2 Others have predicated the conclusion
upon the theory that where the designated beneficiary is pro-
hibited from taking the insurance money, a resulting trust
arises in favor of the estate of the insured.' 3 In three of the
cases the courts held that payment to the estate of the insured
followed as a matter of proper construction of the insurance
contract.'
4
"0 Lord Esher in Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Fund Assoc., supra Note 1,
at 153.
' Cases, supra Note 1. The only case to the contrary which the writer has
been able to discover is Spicer v. New York Life, 268 Fed. 500 (C. C. A. 5th,
1920).
'Metropolitan v. Shane, Henry v. Knights and Daughters of Tabor,
Welch v. Travellers, Anderson v. Life Ins. Co., Hewitt v. Equitable, supra
Note 1.
' Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve, Schmidt v. Northern Life, Slocum v. Metro-
politan, Equitable v. Weightman, Johnston v. Metropolitan, supra Note 1.
"'Robinson v. Metropolitan, Goldstein v. New York Life, Kascoutas v.
Federal Life Ins. Co., supra Note 1.
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Apparently, the courts have experienced some difficulty
in finding satisfactory legalistic support for the result so
clearly dictated by their sense of justice.15
The "resulting trust" explanation, on first impression,
appears to be strained and artificial. Yet it has substantial
historical support.
In England 16 and also, at least, in Massachusetts, 17 the
law had been established, prior to its change by statute, that
the insured or his legal representative was the only person
who could recover on a policy of life insurance, regardless of
who was named beneficiary.
The payee named in or pursuant to the policy of insur-
ance is a third party beneficiary who is neither party nor
privy to the contract. Under the general rule that a person
not privy to a promise made to another could not enforce it
-a rule from which Lawrence v. Fox 18 was such a monu-
mental departure-the beneficiary could not enforce the con-
tract against the promisor. But the promisee-the insured
or his legal representative-could after breach by the insur-
ance company, recover the amount of the policy. The intent
of the insured that the money should be received by the
designated beneficiary was carried out by holding the amount
recovered by the insured's legal representative a trust for the
beneficiary's benefit. The ultimate disposition of the funds
was a matter purely between the legal representative and the
beneficiary and was of no concern in the legal representative's
action against the insurance company. Under that state of
the law, the cutting off of the beneficiary's rights could not
possibly affect the legal representative's recovery against
the insurance company; it eliminated only the beneficiary's
rights over against the legal representative.
I "The theory upon which this is allowed is not altogether clear. * * *
However, whatever the reasoning may be upon which the doctrine is based, it is
too widely recognized to be disregarded"--Judge Frankenthaler in Goldstein v.
New York Life, supra Note 1.
a See Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve, supra.
Wright v. Vermont Life Ins. Co., 164 Mass. 302, 41 N. E. 303 (1895),
and cases therein cited; see also Slocum v. Metropolitan, stupra. The writer has
made no effort to ascertain in which, if any, of the other states similar doctrine
obtained. Nor has the writer inquired into the present law of England on that
subject.
2s20 N. Y. 268 (1859).
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At the time of the Cleaver case,19 in England, the benefi-
ciary was still without right of action against the insurance
company, except that by statute it was provided that where
the insurance was payable to a wife and/or children, a trust
was thereby created, and in such a case the insurance could
be made payable to a designated trustee, who, it seems, would
have, under the statute, a direct cause of action against the
insurance company. The designated beneficiary in that case
was the wife. Her murder of the insured was held to cancel
the trust thus making the insurance collectible by the in-
sured's legal representative just as if the insurance were
payable to a person other than the wife. In that particular
case the policy had failed to name a trustee, and so the money
was recoverable by the executors of the insured, irrespective
of whether or not the wife was ultimately entitled to receive
it. "The defendants must pay the money to the executors,
and then it will be for the executors to deal with it according
to their duty as executors. They would be trustees of it for
the wife if she had not forfeited it; but her interest being
forfeited, it forms part of the insured's estate." 20 That was
the reasoning of Lord Esher. Lord Fry, however, added
that since "public policy prevents Florence Maybrick [the
wife and designated beneficiary] from asserting any title as
cestui que trust of the fund" there arises a "resulting trust in
favor of the estate of the insured" because "Whenever there
is property produced by the payments of A which is held in
trust for B, and that trust fails or is satisfied, a resulting
trust arises for A or his estate." 21 This line of reasoning
was joined in by the other Judge, Lord Lopes.22
In Massachusetts, a beneficiary had no right of action
against the insurance company until a statute enacted in
1894.23 That statute is held to be merely permissive, so that
the legal representative of the insured still has the right to
collect the insurance where the beneficiary fails so to do.24
Cleaver v. Mutual, supra Note 1.
"Ibid. at 155.
2Ibid. at 158, 160.
-2Ibid. at 160-1.
' See Slocum v. Metropolitan, supra Note 1.
'Brown v. Greenfield Life Assoc., 172 Mass. 498, 53 N. E. 129 (1899);
Slocum v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., mpra.
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Where, the beneficiary is barred, as she was in the Slocum
case by reason of her murder of the insured, her right of
action is cut off and the legal representative's right of action
thereby becomes exclusive. If under the statute the benefi-
ciary's right of action were exclusive, the result would be the
same because the beneficiary's loss of the right of action
would bring into existence "a resulting trust in favor of the
estate of the insured." 25
The courts in both the Cleaver and Slocum cases seem to
have anticipated situations where the right of action given to
the beneficiary by statute would, in an ordinary case, exclude
the right of action which the legal representative formerly
had, and decided that a forfeiture by the beneficiary of his
rights would vest them in the insured's legal representative
as the cestui que trust of a "resulting trust."
The "resulting trust" theory is logical and sufficient in
jurisdictions such as England and Massachusetts where
funds collected under policies of life insurance were always
associated with trusts. We have seen that though policies
of life insurance provided that the payments be made to third
parties, they were enforced by the courts in those jurisdic-
tions by compelling payment to the legal representatives of
the insured, because no right of action on a contract was
recognized in a person not privy to the contract. The theory
of a trust in the hands of the legal representative for the
benefit of the beneficiary was resorted to in order to give
effect to the directions of the insured. When a beneficiary,
who by reason of statute, had the legal right to recover but
by his acts forfeited his beneficial rights, it was natural for
the courts to declare that there arose a trust in favor of the
one who would have been entitled to recover but for the
designation of the beneficiary aided by the statute which gave
the latter the right of action. Underlying the entire field of
development of this branch of the law was the recognition
that the essence of the contract was the insurance company's
undertaking to the insured that it would pay the stipulated
sum to or for the benefit of whoever be entitled thereto-
under his designation or by operation of law. The matter of
who should ultimately receive the funds was a question
Slocum v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., supra.
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purely between the legal representative of the insured and
claimants to the fund; the insurance company had no interest
therein.
To lawyers who accept as a matter of course the right of
a beneficiary to recover directly from the insurance company,
the injection of theories of "trust" is quite foreign. In New
York, from the earliest days of life insurance, it was taken
for granted that the beneficiary had a right of action.2 6 A
policy of insurance was a contract, and the beneficiary en-
forced a contract right procured for his benefit. The obliga-
tion of the insurance company certainly was not a trust; and
no trust ever arose upon or after the insurance company's
payment because the payment was made to the person benefi-
cially entitled thereto. Then, on what ground can payment
be enforced to the legal representative of the insured when
the contract provides that the payment should be made to a
named beneficiary?
The same question is presented where the designation of
the beneficiary is void or unlawful or lapses by reason of the
prior death of the beneficiary. In all such cases, it is usually
held that the insurance is payable to those who would have
been entitled to it in the absence of any designation.2 7 So
too, where the policy or certificate provides that the money
shall be payable to a person to be named in the insured's
will and the will fails to designate such a person. 28 Simi-
larly, where for some reason, an assignment fails during the
lifetime of the insured, the policy is payable as if the assign-
ment never were made.29  And where the insurance com-
pany under the policy has the option to pay to either of a
specified number of beneficiaries, and the insurance company
fails to exercise that option, an action by the administrator
.' Hogle v. Guardian Life Ins. Co., 4 Abbts. Pr., N. S., 346, 29 Super. Ct.
567 (1868), where the court said, at 349: "The action is properly brought in
her [the beneficiary's] name (Lawrence v. Fox, 20 N. Y. 265 (1859)), but
whether this is so or not, the plaintiff is the real party in interest and can
maintain the action (Code, Sec. 111)."
-' Walsh v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 133 N. Y. 408, 419, 31 N. E. 228 (1892);
Schmidt v. Northern Life Ins. Co., supra Note 1, and cases cited therein.
' Newman v. Covenant Mutual Ins. Assoc., 76 Iowa 56, 61, 40 N. W. 87
(1888).
'Barry v. Brune, 71 N. Y. 261 (1877) ; Fowler v. Butterly, 78 N. Y. 68
(1879).
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of the insured lies to recover the insurance.30 Conversely,
recovery of the insurance by the designated beneficiary does
not preclude the insured's legal representative from recover-
ing the insurance from the beneficiary if, as between them,
the representative be entitled thereto.31
An analogous situation is presented where there is a
bank account in the joint names of two persons payable to
either and their survivor. Where one of the joint depositors
murders the other, under the contract with the bank and
between the two depositors, the bank's indebtedness is the
property of the survivor. Since the law will not permit him
to profit from his wrong, the contractual payee and owner is
without right in the premises. It might be contended that,
therefore, the bank need pay no one. Needless to say, in an
actual case of this kind which was presented to the courts,
the decision was that the money was payable to the estate of
the victim.3 2 The bank did not even urge that it was entitled
to retain the money.
It is no anomaly to the law to enforce a contract other
than in strict accordance with its terms. When a specific
form of payment is agreed upon between the parties, and that
form of payment becomes impossible or is unenforceable or
is waived, the courts enforce the payment of an equivalent
sum of money.3 3  The doctrines of waiver and substantial
performance are readily resorted to as a substitute for per-
formance strictly in accordance with the letter of the con-
tract.3 4 And in realty cases where the contract day passes
without tender or performance, performance is enforced at
a subsequent day even at the instance of the defaulting party,
except where the contract day is of the essence.
And so in these insurance cases the court separates the
essential from the incidental of the contract. To whoLn pay-
'Wokal v. Belsky, 53 App. Div. 167, 65 N. Y. Supp. 815 (1st Dept. 1900).
'Pacific Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Williams, 79 Tex. 633, 15 S. W. 478
(1891).
'In re Santourian's Estate, 125 Misc. Rep. 668, 212 N. Y. Supp. 116
(Rensselaer County, 1925).
'Day v. N. Y. Central, 51 N. Y. 583 (1873) ; Clark v. West, 137 App.
Div. 23, 122 N. Y. Supp. 380 (2nd Dept. 1910); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 151
App. Div. 174, 135 N. Y. Supp. 908 (4th Dept. 1912).
"See Jacob & Young v. Kent, 230 N. Y. 239, 129 N. E. 889 (1921);
Thomson v. Poor, 147 N. Y. 402, 42 N. E. 13 (1895).
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ment should be made is not an essential, from the point of
view of the insurance company. Its only obligation in the
premises is to abide by the instructions of the insured when
the instructions are binding upon it. Failure of an incident,
that is, a particular designation, should not destroy the
essence. And so the Court of Appeals of New York in one
case stated that it could not conceive of a situation where the
"obligation of the insurance company" would "fail for the
want of a payee." 35 No "resulting trust" theory is necessary
to justify the enforcement of the essential provision of a con-
tract because of the failure of an incidental term in which
the defendant has no real interest. The contract then stands
as if the incidental were never in it, just as a particular provi-
sion in a contract that is void under the law is simply dis-
regarded where it does not affect the essence of the con-
tract.30 The Pennsylvania Superior Court in Robinson v.
Metropolitan Life Insurance Co.37 predicated its decision on
contract law:
"The contract was made directly with Elmer
Freeney. * * * In naming the wife as beneficiary it
was manifestly in contemplation of the parties that
she would not only be alive but capable of receiving
the benefits of the policy. She voluntarily removed
herself from the class of persons entitled to take, * * *
any right of Mrs. Freeney ceased to exist coincidently
with the death of her husband. In effect, therefore,
there was no named beneficiary when the obligation of
the company to pay arose."
The same thought was expressed in a different form in a
recent New York case: 38
"* * * the implied intention of the parties was
that, if the beneficiary should be unable to take, the
'Walsh v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., supra Note 27.
' Central N. Y. Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Averill, 199 N. Y. 128, 140-1, 92 N. E.
206, 210 (1910).
'Supra Note 1.
's Goldstein v. New York Life, supra Note 1.
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insurance should be paid to those who would take it
in the absence of a beneficiary."
It frequently happens that a beneficiary is a next of kin
of the murdered insured entitled to a share or the whole of
the decedent's estate. In those jurisdictions where it is held
that murder is a forfeiture of a distributive share of the
estate of the victim, no difficulty is presented because under
that rule there is no possibility of the murderer getting any
part of the insurance money from the administrator or execu-
tor. "The same principle of public policy which precludes
him from claiming directly under the insurance contract,
equally precludes him from claiming under the statute of
descent and distribution." 39
A real problem is presented in those jurisdictions where
the courts hold that murder does not alter the distribution
and descent provided for by statute.40  If the insurance
money goes into the estate, the beneficiary, in those states,
ultimately becomes entitled to all or a portion of the insur-
ance money, depending upon the extent of the assets and
liabilities of the estate and the existence of other distributees.
In a case decided in West Virginia,41 the beneficiary
named in the policy was the wife of the insured and there
were no children and no creditors and under the laws of West
Virginia she was entitled to the entire estate notwithstand-
ing the fact that she murdered her husband. Therefore,
"every dollar of the fund recovered by the administrator in
his representative capacity must go to the murderer." That
fact, it was held, necessitated denying recovery from the
insurance company. That decision, however, presents the
minority view. Under precisely similar facts, the Court of
Civil Appeals of Texas 42 permitted a recovery. The ques-
tion was presented also in Oklahoma,43 where under the law
of that state the murdering wife would participate in the
victim's estate and by reason thereof would receive a portion
ISlocum v. Metropolitan, supra Note 1, at 570. To the same effect,
Cleaver v. Mutual Reserve Fund Assoc., supra Note 1.
"Supra Note 7.
"Johnston v. Metropolitan, supra Note 1.
"Murchison v. Murchison, supra Note 1.
"Equitable Life v. Weightman, supra Note 1.
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of the insurance money. The court there held "this coinci-
dence cannot interfere with the reason of the general rule." 44
In a recent New York case,45 it was held at Special Term,
that where an assignee of a policy of life insurance, as dis-
tinguished from a beneficiary, murders the insured, the policy
need be paid to no one because "by virtue of the assignment
the insured surrendered all his right, title and interest in the
policies and his contractual relation with the company may
be regarded as having terminated. * * * Under such circum-
stances" the Court could "see no ground for any implication
that the parties intended that if the assignee, the sole owner
of the policies, should be disqualified from taking, the insur-
ance should be paid to the estate of the assured." What the
Appellate Courts will say upon the position, remains to be
seen. It may be suggested that the equities against the in-
surance company's not paying the amount of the policy are
just as strong where the murder is committed by the assignee
as where the murder is committed by the beneficiary. In
either case the insurance company has received all that it was
entitled to receive; and whether payment be directed by the
designation of a beneficiary or by assignment is, as against
the insurance company, more a matter of form than sub-
stance, although there may be a real difference as against the
insured. Very frequently, too, the assignment is merely by
way of collateral security or for a limited purpose or to a
limited extent. The fact that the insured executed or filed
with the insurance company an "assignment" does not neces-
sarily mean that the insured surrendered all his rights there-
under or ceased to pay the premiums thereon. In any event,
we have seen that where an assignment fails during the life-
time of the insured, the policy is payable as if the assignment
never were made. Does it make any difference whether the
assignment fails during the lifetime of the insured or by
reason of the circumstances of his death? Just as in the case
of a beneficiary, the rights of a murdering assignee cease "to
exist coincidentally with the death" of the insured. There-
fore, is it not true that, in contemplation of law, there is no
assignee when the obligation of the company to pay arises?
"Ibid. at 112.
46 Goldstein v. New York Life Ins. Co., stepra Note 1.
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If there be no assignee at the time of the death, then, of
course, the insurance is payable to the estate of the insured.
Another phase of the subject is presented where the con-
tract of insurance is made with and procured by the mur-
derer on the life of the victim. For example, a wife procures
the issuance of a policy on the life of her husband; she is the
insured, the contract is between her and the insurance com-
pany, the premiums are paid by her, she is to receive the
stipulated sum upon the maturity of the policy, and the
husband's only connection with the policy is that he is the
subject thereof, that is, it is payable upon his death. It
would seem that an insured who murders the subject of a
policy should be in no better position to recover under his
(the murderer's) contract than a beneficiary who after mur-
dering the insured should seek to recover under the victim's
contract. Incontestability clauses and statutes, however, may
result in a different holding, just as statutes of descent and
distribution have been held to prevent a forfeiture by a mur-
derer of his interest in his victim's estate. If, however, in-
contestability clauses or statutes should be held not to affect
the result or in a case where the murder is committed before
the period fixed in the incontestability statute or clause, the
court would have to decide whether the murderer's forfeiture
of his rights completely cancelled the insurance company's
obligation, or whether the insurance should go to the estate
of the victim, on some theory of subrogation, by way of in-
demnification for the insured's wrongful act.46
" But see New York, etc. Ins. Co. v. Armstrong, 117 U. S. 591, 6 Sup. Ct.
877 (1886). In that case, however, no incontestability clause or statute was
involved, the murder having been committed within six weeks after the issu-
ance of the policy. Moreover, several of the decisions of the United States
Supreme Court affecting life insurance are in conflict with the holdings of the
State Courts. For example, in Burt v. Union Central Life Ins. Co., 187 U. S.
362, 23 Sup. Ct. 139 (1902), and N. W. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. McCue, 223
U. S. 234, 32 Sup. Ct. 220 (1911), the court held that where the insured meets
his death as a result of execution by the state in punishment for a crime com-
mitted by the insured no recovery could be had on policies in which he was the
insured, not only on the ground of public policy but also on the ground that
"there is an implied obligation" on the part of the insured "to do nothing to
wrongfully accelerate the maturity of the policy.'" The courts of Georgia,
Illinois, North Carolina, Pennsylvania and Tennessee hold the contrary (see
37 C. J. 548). In Ritter v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 169 U. S. 139, 18 Sup. Ct.
300 (1897) the court held that suicide by the insured excused the insurance
company from paying the policy, also on the ground of public policy and the
further ground that suicide was by implication an excepted risk. That case
has been repudiated by the United States Supreme Court itself (N. W. Life
Ins. Co. v. Jones, 254 U. S. 96, 41 Sup. Ct. 47 (1920).
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The foregoing analysis of the authorities in this field of
law results from the belief that the search for the logic of a
rule of law which has been developed by the courts is more
than "an intellectual passion for elegentia juris, for sym-
metry of form and of substance." 47 It brings to the fore an
understanding of the problem and of the forces at work. "The
demon of formalism tempts the intellect with the lure of
scientific order." 48 A narrow view of a legal principle often
leads to a conclusion impossible in the perspective gained by
a consideration of the setting in which the question arises.
COPAL MINTZ.
New York City.
, Cardozo, The Nature of The Judicial Process, p. 34.
"Ibid. at 66.
